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Starting the Dawes Plan 
Address by 
G E O R G E P. A U L D 
of 
H A S K I N S & S E L L S 
Certified Public Accountants 
Delivered December 6, 1924 
Before the 
C H I C A G O C O U N C I L O N F O R E I G N R E L A T I O N S 
140 South Dearborn Street 
C H I C A G O 
Pamphlet No. 5 
I N T R O D U C T O R Y L E T T E R 
from 
C H A R L E S G. DAWES 
By way of introduction, the following letter from 
G E N E R A L C H A R L E S G. D A W E S is quoted: 
" I want to express my regret at not being able to be 
present at the meeting of the Chicago Council on Foreign 
Relations at which Commander George P. A u l d is to speak. 
"Before I became associated with M r . A u l d in repara-
tions work I had read his brilliant articles on reparations 
questions in the magazine " F o r e i g n Affairs," signed " A l p h a . " 
H i s chief article showed that he was not only an economist, 
but what is equally as important, a practical man. Before 
reading Commander Auld's article, I had read a number of 
other economic contributions to the subject, and to me it was 
like the sound of a clear bell in the fog. 
"Commander Auld's official connection with the repara-
tions work and with the institution of the Experts' Plan in 
Germany makes him an authority on the subject. 
" W i t h best wishes to the Council on Foreign Relations 
which, since its formation, has so signally demonstrated its 
great and growing influence for better international under-
standing." 
"Yours , 
(Signed) Charles G. Dawes." 
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S T A R T I N G T H E DAWES P L A N 
Address by 
G E O R G E P. A U L D 
I consider it a great privilege to meet the members of 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and to take part 
in their discussions. I speak before this company with diffi-
dence. In the past year knowledge of what is going on in 
Europe has become much more widely disseminated. Much 
more than formerly our citizens have been going abroad with 
a serious purpose; persons in a position to make close con-
tact with European affairs and qualified to interpret them 
intelligently and report on them faithfully. There are many 
such present today. Mr. Hurley is here, a man who is charged 
with a heavy responsibility in connection with the great ques-
tion of inter-allied debts and who has demonstrated that he 
is equal to that responsibility. Another sane and shrewd 
observer of European affairs sits near me—a man who during 
a considerable part of the past few months has served with 
distinction at Berlin in a capacity which is best defined as the 
Allied Chargé d'Affaires for Reparations. I refer, of course, 
to my friend, Mr. Rufus Dawes. In these circumstances I 
can justify my venturing to speak on the Dawes Plan and the 
debt problem generally only by the thought that no two per-
sons ever get precisely the same picture and that it is some-
times useful to compare notes. 
The problem of Europe's public debts is primarily a prob-
lem for Europe, for she will stand or fall according as its 
solution restores or further disintegrates the social fabric of 
the old world. But from another point of view, it is our prob-
lem, for destiny has thrown such a preponderance of power 
and prestige into our hands that American policy will be 
determining in its solution. Evidently we have a large 
responsibility. 
With the starting of the Dawes Plan we have had an 
impressive object lesson as to our potentialities in this new 
role of World leadership, and we are beginning to be clear 
as to the nature of our responsibility. 
During a period of five years, while we groped for light 
on the subject, our responsibility in practice was a passive 
one. That may have been unavoidable. Perhaps the fever 
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of nationalistic passions in Europe had to abate somewhat 
before we could hope to develop a genuinely American policy 
and intervene effectively. More certainly, we had to stand 
firm and perhaps impassive until the idea of cancellation of 
debts had run its course. 
That doctrine was presented to the American people by 
well meaning economic experts as the complete answer. Our 
responsibility was to be nothing more nor less than money 
charity on a cosmic scale. W e were assured that this would 
solve the reparation problem and cure the world of all its 
economic ills. It was to be the universal panacea. More-
over, economic laws were said to make it inevitable, and it, 
therefore, seemed to many to offer the quick and easy way 
out. But the great majority of the American people instinc-
tively rejected this solution, and very rightly. It was a false 
philosophy and the so-called economic laws advanced in sup-
port of it, so far as we may now judge, had no real validity. 
We may be quite sure that the people of Europe do not 
need any such vast and indiscriminate money charity. They 
need, it is true, considerate treatment—fair treatment—in the 
matter of their debts to us. They need, also, an intelligent 
response to their requirements for loans, and they need reas-
onable terms for those loans. But this wil l be only practical 
common sense. The charity which they need is the real 
charity of compassion and understanding. They need what 
the Dawes plan is now giving them—something of the vigor-
ous optimism of America in their councils. They need, very 
vitally, and wil l continue to need, our moral support. 
Unti l lately, we have failed them badly in this respect. 
We have adopted a certain attitude of moral condescension 
toward them. We have been prone to condemn them for 
their failures to achieve a real peace. Distance explains our 
inadequate conception of the catastrophe which overwhelmed 
Europe in 1914, and a totally different background of life 
excuses in a measure our failure to appreciate the difficulties 
of reconstruction. But to condemn what we do not fully 
comprehend is to accentuate an element of intolerance in our 
national character which is alien to American ideals. 
Those who know what the sight of the first American 
troops meant to the Allies in 1917 will understand what in 
only lesser degree the arrival last winter of General Dawes, 
Mr. Young and Mr. Robinson meant to the weary protago-
nists in the reparation tragedy. It meant hope. Here at 
last was a message from the young Colossus of the West in 
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whose hands all the threads of destiny were gathered. The 
European peoples wanted peace, but they could not get it. 
They were prisoners of a terrible stalemate. They needed to 
find some common ground, and they found it almost immedi-
ately in the confidence inspired by General Dawes, whose 
vigorous and practical mind cut through a fog of bitter doc-
trinaire and legalistic controversy down to the essentials. 
A sure sense of political and social realities, a deep attachment 
to the spirit of fair play and a genius for getting things done 
were perhaps the greatest of the high qualifications which he 
brought to the task of stabilizing Europe. 
And during the deliberations of the Committee and later 
when General Dawes had returned to the United States, the 
representatives of the Allies and of Germany gave their con-
fidence in full measure to his colleague. While the Plan was 
being prepared and during the critical days of the London Con-
ference and the starting of the Plan, they found in Owen D. 
Young that rare combination of qualities which makes it pos-
sible for a few men in a generation to serve a great cause 
greatly. A penetrating intellect, faith in humanity, courage, 
patience and a just mind—these are some of the things that 
have bound many men of many nationalities to Owen Young 
and have brought honor to his name in Europe. 
A new spirit of co-operation is abroad in Europe today. 
It cannot be said that America created it, for such a thing 
cannot be created out of hand. It was already there, but 
America in the person of its representatives released it as 
an active principle. The European machine is now running 
and America furnished the oil which made it possible to set 
it going. It was not started without great labor, great skill 
and almost unbelieveable patience and good will on the part 
of those who drafted the Report and those who participated 
in the London Conference. 
Europe's contribution was a great one. At one of the 
fateful moments of history, the premiers of England, France, 
and Germany plainly showed that they were men of genuine 
good will and great political courage. It may be said that 
they were under the most vital necessity of reaching a settle-
ment, for no one dared to consider the possible effects of a 
rupture. But they acted courageously, none the less, and 
they reaped their reward in finding widespread public support 
for their policies. 
The mechanical features of the actual starting of the plan 
were significant only as they related to these moral aspects. 
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The general background of the arrangement created by the 
London Conference was acceptance of the principle of arbi-
tration. Sixteen or seventeen separate arbitrations are pro-
vided for. Many of them are likely never to be invoked, for 
an agreement to arbitrate is evidence of a frame of mind which 
leads toward direct settlements by the parties themselves. 
Up to the present every point of difference which has arisen 
has shown itself susceptible of that sort of treatment. 
The minimum of friction was caused by the application 
of the plan. The control bodies set up in Berlin were ac-
cepted by the Germans with perfect good will . During the 
interim period before the flotation of the loan, the German 
Government met all its payments promptly and co-operated 
in every way. The arrangements for deliveries of coal and 
other products which had been in force in the occupied areas 
were promptly extended by common consent on a commercial 
basis, and a joint committee was formed to settle the details 
of a continuing system of this character. Certain questions 
of valuation of services rendered to the Armies of Occupa-
tion are still pending, but progress has been made toward 
settlement. The economic sanctions were withdrawn by the 
French and Belgians on the agreed schedule and unexpected 
progress was made in the direction of military evacuation of 
the Ruhr. 
The crux of the application of the plan was the loan. 
In principle, its flotation was a foregone conclusion. It was 
bound to come. But in practice, as the first of its kind, it 
was evident that the question of the security behind it would 
require careful examination. The negotiations were pro-
tracted and some feared that the delay might have unfortun-
ate or even fatal results. Everything seemed to be poised 
on a delicate balance which might at any moment be upset. 
Happily the brief delay necessitated in the successive steps 
for bringing the plan into operation had no serious results 
whatever. The world seemed to have faith in the plan. 
The Dawes plan has given Europe what it has so badly 
needed for six unhappy years—a modus vivendi. It is only 
that—like the organization of society itself—but that is its 
virtue. It is a triumph of the principle of attending to first 
things first, of acting on things agreed instead of waiting 
for agreement on everything. One thing could not be agreed 
—how much Germany was to pay in all—and it was the 
quarrel over this question that had prostrated Europe. It 
was a bitter speculative dispute and it was incapable of amic-
able settlement at the time for the reason that both creditor 
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gated in order that the theory might be properly tested. It 
is therefore provided by the plan that the annuity shall be 
paid in marks to the Agent General of the Allies at Berlin, 
and the German liability discharged as these payments are 
made. If the German people pay their taxes, no claim can 
be advanced that Germany has defaulted. The problem of 
transferring the payments abroad is up to the Allies, as 
represented by the Transfer Committee. 
This is the well known problem of the export surplus— 
premised on the assertions of economists that debtor coun-
tries can pay their external obligations only by gold or goods. 
As the supply of gold is limited, it would follow that they 
can pay only by a huge surplus of exported goods, the creation 
of which is probably impossible, or, if not impossible, raises 
visions of a dumping menace to creditor nations. This 
apparent dilemma runs through most discussions of the rep-
aration and inter-allied debt question, and the doctrine from 
which it is derived is widely accepted in England and Amer-
ica. It is a huge fallacy. Any economist, if cross questioned, 
will admit that debtor countries after exporting their avail-
able surplus of gold and goods have always settled their in-
ternational balances by exporting their own securities. But 
this fact of first importance the economist rules out on the 
grounds that it does not constitute a final solution—that 
some day the indebtedness wil l have to be finally paid off. 
He returns, therefore, to the formula, gold or goods. 
This insistence upon final solutions is the great weakness 
of the doctrinaire. He dislikes the thought of permitting 
nature to assume any of the responsibility for the solution of 
the world's economic difficulties. But he has only developed 
this weakness since the War. Before the War, when Europe 
was the great creditor, the debtor countries of the world had a 
private funded indebtedness to England, France and Germany 
of 30,000,000,000 of pre-war dollars, equal to $45,000,000,000 
of today, and this indebtedness at the time the War broke 
out was being increased probably at the rate of $2,000,000,000 
or $3,000,000,000 a year. The interest and the amortization pay-
ments on the individual debts making up this huge total were 
regularly made without the least difficulty. No one bothered 
to ask how it was done. There was no talk of a dumping 
menace or unhealthy stimulation of the industries of the 
debtor countries. The interest and amortization payments 
were not taken in goods, but were reinvested. No exchange 
difficulties arose for the reason that as individual issues were 
paid off new issues simultaneously replaced them as an outlet 
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for the surplus funds accruing to the account of the creditor 
countries. In short, the indebtedness as a whole, so far as 
anyone could foresee, was a permanent one. 
The post-war question of whether a debtor country, 
which by definition is a country with an export deficit, will 
be able to produce an export surplus for the payment of its 
debts, and thus become a creditor country, was never raised 
before the war. It was one of the great open questions which 
the future had to settle, if it needed to be settled at all. So 
far as the American indebtedness was concerned fortuitous 
circumstances settled it. By a colossal burst of productive 
energy the United States poured billions of dollars worth of 
goods into the insatiable furnace of war, and created a bal-
ance on the other side of the account. But this abnormal 
operation will not soon or ever be repeated in a reverse direc-
tion. We have returned to the normal situation, only with a 
different set of debtors and creditors. When economists 
assert that Germany or France cannot produce export sur-
pluses sufficient to pay their debts, they may be correct. 
When they say that this is the only way the debts could 
ever be paid, they are certainly wrong. 
Foreign capital in the form of loans has now begun to 
flow into Germany. So long as this continues, it seems clear 
that there will be no transfer problem, for the annuities will 
be paid over the exchanges against these foreign currencies. 
In this way the transfers for the year 1925 have already been 
provided for and they are being regularly effected. 
This seems likely to prove the definite solution of the 
problem of transfer. For an indefinite period of years, Ger-
many like certain other European countries, will be a debtor 
nation and will presumably be in the position of having a pri -
vate external debt of a permanent character, gradually taking 
the place of the public external debt, as the latter is paid off. 
It would appear that the payment of the reparation debt 
and of the inter-allied debts hinges largely on the question of 
whether the United States can and will finance Europe. It 
seems evident that we wil l be able to do so for a considerable 
period of years—perhaps indefinitely, certainly long enough so 
that we need not worry about the question now. Nearly a 
billion dollars of foreign securities have been sold in the 
United States this year, without the least difficulty. E v i -
dently the investor believes Europe to be a good risk. When 
Europe was the world creditor, she produced sufficient for 
her own consumption plus her home capital requirements, 
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At the close of Mr. Auld's address, the Chairman called on 
Mr. Rufus C. Dawes for a few remarks. 
R U F U S C. D A W E S . 
One ought to hesitate to express too quickly an opinion 
about such a paper as that to which we have just listened. 
But I am ready to say that I think Commander Auld, with 
his keen intelligence and broad sympathy, has shed new light 
upon one of the most difficult problems of today, just as in 
his articles in "Foreign Affairs" he showed a new avenue of 
approach to the question which was then the very center of 
the world's interests. 
Robert Ingersoll said that if he were to create a world, 
he would make health and not disease contagious, but Com-
mander Auld has shown us that the mere human instinct to 
gain a higher rate of interest may, in this crisis, be the salva-
tion of the world. 
The payment of war indemnities and international indebt-
edness is a burden resting upon the world, from which there 
is no escape. The contemplation of these burdens arouses 
fears as to the effect upon the progress of business, the com-
fort of the people, and the maintenance of peace. But the 
debts are the inevitable result of the war. Many have wished 
to see them cancelled, but that is impossible. They cannot 
be brushed aside. 
The plan of the Experts has now been written, in its 
entirety, into an international treaty. It may not have been 
a perfect plan, or even the best plan. But it was an agree-
ment. That is the important thing. It was not an ideal 
economic adjustment written upon a clean slate. It was a plan 
for the re-establishment of relations between nations which 
had been exhausted by war. It was an agreement and as such 
was the beginning of the process of reconstruction. 
It is consoling to be assured that nature itself offers 
remedies for the repair of wounds that have been received, 
and that automatic forces are likely to come into operation 
in such a manner as to lighten the burdens which all must 
share. By the sale of European securities in the United States, 
which the desire for profit on the part of our investors will 
bring about, the peoples of Europe will obtain the means of 
stabilizing their currencies and replenishing their working 
capital. 
Through this process the period will be prolonged within 
which the payment of the debt is to be made. Future gener-
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ations will share, as they ought to share, in the adjustment of 
these relations. If the time comes when it is realized that 
these debts can never be paid, the men of some future gener-
ation can bury this corpse, but while these resources of our 
national credit are alive and breathing, we cannot bury them. 
And now since Commander Auld has made a reference to 
my visit to Berlin, and has himself stated that Germany has 
accepted and is carrying out in good faith the terms of the 
London agreement, I feel I ought to add my testimony to 
his, and to say, as Mr. Owen D. Young, himself, has said, 
that Germany has met in the fullest measure every promise 
that it made. I may quote the words of that high-minded 
statesman, Chancellor Marx, who said that his government 
desired nothing more than to convince the world of its perfect 
good faith. The time has come when we must accept such 
assurances, and since even we, who meet in small gatherings 
such as this, have some influence, we ought to assert it in such 
a manner as to help rebuild faith and confidence in human 
nature. We must lay aside our provincial prejudices and cease 
to believe that because a man is a Frenchman, a German or 
an Englishman, he is therefore a liar. When the Committee 
of Experts met in Berlin during their early conferences, Chan-
cellor Marx stated that this problem ought to be approached 
by all in a spirit of Christian forbearance. In just this spirit 
also the settlement must be applied. 
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